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SPHERES AND NETWORKS: 
TWO WAYS TO REINTERPRET
GLOBALIZATION
Bruno Latour
A lecture at Harvard University Graduate School of Design 
February 17, 2009, immediately after the preceding lecture by Peter Sloterdijk
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sense of the word, since as we know from Peter, “Dasein
ist design”). 
Peter and I have proposed to introduce, each in our
own way, two sets of concepts, one coming from spheres
and the other from networks. And let me say at the
beginning that I have to agree with Peter that what is
usually called networks is an “anemic” conjunction 
of two intersecting lines that are even less plausible 
than the vast global space of no space that it pretends 
to replace. Fortunately my own notion of network, 
or rather of actor-network, has borrowed more from
Leibniz and Diderot than from the Internet, and in a
way, one could say that Peter’s spheres and my networks
are two ways of describing monads: Once God is taken
out of Leibniz’s monads, there are not many other ways
for them but to become, on the one hand, spheres and,
on the other, networks. I’d like to test those two concepts
to see whether they begin to lead us to some testable
conclusion—a thought experiment, remember, is indeed
an experiment that, even though impractical, should be
able to discriminate between arguments. 
Spheres and networks might not have much in
common, but they have both been elaborated against
the same sort of enemy: an ancient and constantly
deeper apparent divide between nature and society. 
“BEING HAS BEEN TOO SUPERFICIALLY CONSIDERED:
DASEIN HAS NO CLOTHES, NO HABITAT, NO BIOLOGY,
NO HORMONES, NO ATMOSPHERE AROUND IT, NO
MEDICATION, NO VIABLE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
EVEN TO REACH HIS HÜTTE IN THE BLACK FOREST.”
Opposite Louis Kahn, Salk Institute for Biological Studies, 
La Jolla, California, 1965. Photo: Ezra Stoller/ESTO. 
Left Bruno Latour, “Networks and Spheres,” February 17, 
2009, GSD. Photo: Justin Knight.
I was born a Sloterdijkian. When, thirty years ago, I was
preparing the proofs of Laboratory Life, I had included 
in the pictures, to the disgust of my scientist informants, 
a black-and-white photograph of the air-conditioned
machinery of the Salk Institute in which I had done my
fieldwork. “What does this has to do with our science?”
they asked, to which I could only reply: “Everything.”
Without knowing it, I had always been a “spherologist,”
as I discovered about twenty years later when I became
familiar with Peter Sloterdijk’s work in another locally
situated, air-conditioned place: his school in Karlsruhe,
which was separated by no more than one courtyard
from the Center for Art and Media, where I twice had 
the great chance to experiment with installations and
exhibitions—what, with Peter Weibel, we call a Gedanke
Austellung or “thought exhibition,” the equivalent in art
of a “thought experiment” in science. 
We are assembled tonight for another thought
experiment, namely to imagine on what conditions the
world, at the time of globalization, could be made
habitable—all of those contemporary metaphors have
become important: sustainable, durable, breathable,
livable—and also to explore what would be the ideal
program, curriculum, or school to train its architects 
and designers (and “design” is taken here in the largest
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Peter asks his master Heidegger the rather mischie-
vous questions: “When you say Dasein is thrown into
the world, where is it thrown? What’s the temperature
there, the color of the walls, the material that has been
chosen, the technology for disposing of refuse, the cost
of the air-conditioning, and so on?”Here the apparently
deep philosophical ontology of “Being qua Being” takes
a rather diﬀerent turn. Suddenly we realize that it is the
“pro-found question” of Being that has been too super-
ficially considered: Dasein has no clothes, no habitat, 
no biology, no hormones, no atmosphere around it, no
medication, no viable transportation system even to
reach his Hütte in the Black Forest. Dasein is thrown into
the world but is so naked that it doesn’t stand much
chance of survival. 
When you begin to ask these naughty questions, 
the respective relations between depth and super-
ficiality are suddenly reversed: There is not the slightest
chance of understanding Being once it has been cut oﬀ
from the vast numbers of apparently trifling and super-
ficial little beings that make it exist from moment to
moment—what Peter came to call its “life supports.” 
In one stroke, the philosopher’s quest for “Being as such”
looks like an antiquated research program. As socio-
logist/psychologist Gabriel Tarde had anticipated a
century ago, philosophers had chosen the wrong verb:
“To be” has led them nowhere except to a melodramatic
quandary of identity versus nothingness. The right 
verb should have been “to have,” because then, 
as Tarde says, no one can sever the two-way connections
between the “having” and the “had.” (It is hard to
imagine an audience finding tragic a Hamlet who would
ponder, “To have or not to have, that is the question.”)
The same reversal of depth and superficiality was
achieved when science studies began to “embed” the
practice of science—until then construed as the most
implausible and most mysterious achievements of a dis-
embodied set of invisible brains in the vat —into larger,
more visible, more costly, more localized, and vastly
more realistic vats, namely laboratories or better, net-
works of connected laboratories. Once the little shock of
realizing that science, which until then had been able to
meander freely through the vast expanses of time and
space without paying any special price or even being
embodied in any specific human, came to be suddenly
restricted and circumscribed to tiny, fragile, and costly
networks of practices to which it could not escape except
by paying the full cost of its material extension—once
this shock had been absorbed, it became quickly clear
that science had found a much safer and more sustain-
able ground. Objectivity too had found its life supports;
it had been reimplanted into plausible ecosystems. The
truth conditions that episte-mologists had looked for in
vain inside logic had finally been situated in highly
specific truth factories.
Now I beg you to consider the two moves at once
because, taken in isolation, they produce the worst
possible solution: If you understand what Peter did to
Dasein in abandoning Heidegger and philosophy more
generally (because he reconnected the naked human
with its life supports), it means that you have confused
the plug in of life supports with the invasion of “nature.”
It is as if he had said: “Enough phenomenology. Let’s
naturalize the whole goddamn human by using the most
recent results of the hard sciences: neurology, biology,
chemistry, physics, technology, you name them!”
Conversely, if you think that by situating Science with 
a capital S inside the tiny loci of disseminated labora-
tories, we, the science students, have made it hostage 
of human vagaries, it means that you have confused 
“THE WHOLE ENTERPRISE AROUND SPHERES AND 
NETWORKS—WHICH SUPERFICIALLY LOOKS LIKE A
REDUCTION, A LIMITATION, TO TINY LOCAL SCENES—
IS IN EFFECT A SEARCH FOR SPACE, FOR A VASTLY
MORE COMFORTABLY INHABITABLE SPACE.”
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our enterprise with an appeal to “society,” as if we 
had been saying “enough belief in the objective view
from nowhere. Let’s deconstruct science and make it a
narrative among narrative inside a flow of narratives.” 
The opposite strategies of naturalization and social-
ization are able to stupefy the mind only because they
are always thought of separately. But as soon as you
combine the two moves, you realize that nature and
society are two perfectly happy bedfellows whose
opposition is a farce, and that what Peter and I did was,
in our own ways, to kick both of them out of their beds,
and then to attempt something just as foreign to natural-
ization as it is to socialization—or, even worse, to “social
construction.” Spheres and networks allow, in our view,
a reclaiming of the little beings that make up the life
supports without the superficial gloss the philosophy 
of natural sciences has provided them: The re-local-
ization and re-embodiment of science allows us to
extract, so to speak, the epistemological poison out of
the sweet honey of scientific objectivity. You may throw
Dasein into the world by redistributing its properties
(a word, by the way, more easily connected to the verb
“to have” than the verb “to be”), only if the world into
which it is thrown is not that of “nature.” And the only
way this world can be real, objective, and material
without being “natural” is first to have redistributed and
re-localized science. As the altermondialistes and anti-
globalization folks chant so rightly: “Another world is
possible.” Maybe, but on the condition that we are no
longer restricted to the meager combat rations of nature
and society.
When we ponder how the global world could be
made habitable—a question especially important for
architects and designers—we now mean habitable for
billions of humans and trillions of other creatures that
no longer form a nature or, of course, a society, but
rather, to use my term, a possible collective (contrary to
the dual notions of nature-and-society, the collective 
is not collected yet, and no one has the slightest idea of
what it is to be composed of, how it is to be assembled, 
or even if it should be assembled into one piece). But
why has the world been made uninhabitable in the first
place? More precisely, why has it not been conceived as
if the question of its habitability was the only question
worth asking? 
I am more and more convinced that the answer lies
in this extremely short formula: lack of space. Paradox-
ically, the whole enterprise around spheres and net-
works—which superficially looks like a reduction, 
a limitation, to tiny local scenes—is in eﬀect a search 
for space, for a vastly more comfortably inhabitable
space. When we speak of the global, of globalization, 
we always tend to exaggerate the extent to which we
access this global sphere: In eﬀect, we do nothing more
than gesture with a hand that is never been much bigger
than a reasonably sized pumpkin. Peter has a version
even more radical than my pumpkin argument: There is
no access to the global for the simple reason that you
always move from one place to the next through narrow
corridors without ever being outside. Outside you would
as certainly die as would a cosmonaut who, much like
the famed Capitaine Haddock, simply decides to leave
the space station without a spacesuit. Global talks are at
best tiny topics inside well-heated hotel rooms in Davos. 
The great paradox of our two enterprises is that
spheres and networks are ways first to localize the global
so as, in a second move, to provide more space in the
end than the mythical “outside” that had been devised
by the nature-and-society mythology.
An anthropologist of the Moderns like myself cannot
but be continually struck by how implausible, un-
comfortable, and cramped have been the places that the
architects of the Moderns have devised for them—and
here I am not thinking only of card-carrying architects
but also of people like John Locke or Immanuel Kant or
Martin Heidegger. It is ironic that so many people on the
Left, at least in Europe, complain that we live in a time
when the wretched of the world are no longer longing for
any utopia. For me, it is the whole history of the Moderns
that oﬀers up a most radical utopia in the etymological
sense: The Moderns have no place, no topos, no locus 
to sit and stay. The view from nowhere, so prevalent in 
the old scientific imagination, also means that there is
nowhere for those who hold it to realistically reside.
Could you survive a minute as a brain in a vat separated
by a huge gap from “reality”? And yet this is the posture
you are supposed to hold in order to think logically.
Could you survive much longer by having your mind
turned into a computer-like brain? Modernists have no
place, no hookup, no plugs-in for harnessing in any
plausible way the revelations of science about what it 
is to be material and objective. I learned from Marshall
Sahlins this joke: “Reality is a nice place to visit, but no
one ever lives there”—Without doubt a Modernists’ joke:
Realism is not their forte.
How can we account, as historians and anthropolo-
gists and philosophers, for this lack of space, a lack of
space so radical that Modernists had to migrate into a
continuously renewed utopia? One distinct possibility 
is the confusion of space with paper. Architects are
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called inscription and immutable and combinable
mobiles are admirable, but they should not be confused
either with a catastrophic diluvium or with the magni-
ficent advent of Reason on earth. Far from being what
the world is made of—and thus out of which the res
cogitans should flee as far as possible—they are no more
than a few of the many components contained inside the
world of spheres and networks. The global is a form of
circulation inside those sites, not what could contain
them. The Latin etymology of the res extensa contains, 
to be sure, an extensibility that borders on the infectious,
but this is no reason for sound minds to let it trespass
beyond the narrow confines of inscription practices—
and even less to imagine that it is such a mimetic
description of the world that the whole real world of
living organisms should migrate out of the res extensa,
now construed as “space,” as the only thing that really
stands. This absurdly extensive definition of the res
extensa is probably the most hidden but the most 
potent source of nihilism. Imagine that—the real world
confused with the white expanse of a piece of paper!
There is probably no more decisive diﬀerence among
thinkers than the position they are inclined to take on
space: Is space what inside which reside objects and
subjects? Or is space one of the many connections made
by objects and subjects? In the first tradition, if you
empty the space of all entities there is something left:
space. In the second, since entities engender their space
(or rather their spaces) as they trudge along, if you take
the entities out, nothing is left, especially space. Tell me
what your position on space is, and I’ll tell you who you
are: I suspect such a touchstone is equally discrimi-
nating for philosophers, architects, art historians, 
and others. 
In the case of Peter and me, I hope it’s clear that we
belong to the same side of the divide: Spheres and net-
works have been devised to suck in the res extensa, to
bring it back to specific places, trades, instruments, and
media, and to let it circulate again but without losing a
moment of what in the industry is called its traceability.
Peter has even succeeded in devoting a whole volume 
of his trilogy, Sphären, to the rematerialization and re-
localization of the global itself, so that thanks to his pain-
staking redescription, even the famous “view from no-
where” has found a place, a specific architecture, 
generally that of Domes and Halls and frescoes, a specific
lighting, a specific posture. History of thought is now
being made part of the history of art, of architecture, 
of design, of intellectual technologies–in brief a branch
of spherology. The global is part of local histories. 
especially familiar with the manipulation of drawings,
and this manipulation is now at the fingertips of any
dumb-downed user of CAD design software or even
Google maps. Manipulation of geometric forms is so
intoxicating that it can lead some—notably my
compatriot René Descartes—to imagine that this is also
the way in which material things navigate and reside in
space. My argument is that res extensa—taken for the
“material world” and considered until recently as the
stuﬀ out of which “nature” is made— is an unfortunate
confusion of the properties of geometrical forms on
white paper with the ways material beings stand. 
Let us be careful here: I am not saying that human
intentional embodied mind and spirit never really look
at the material world according to the laws of geometry.
(The critique has been made often enough; the whole of
phenomenology has explored this avenue already.) I am
saying that even the material physical objects making
up the world do not stand in the world according to what
would be expected of them if they were thrown into res
extensa. In other words, the “scientific world view” is
unfair to human intentionality, spiritual values, and
ethical dimensions does not bother me too much: I am
much more concerned if it is even more unfair to the
peculiar ways electrons, rocks, amoebas, lice, rats,
plants, buildings, locomotives, computers, mobiles, and
pills have a hold and a standing in this world. Nothing,
absolutely nothing, ever resided in res extensa—not
even a worm, a tick, or a speck of dust—but masses of
beings have been exquisitely drawn on white paper,
engraved on copper, photographed on silver salt-coated
plates, modeled on the computer, etc.—including
worms, ticks, and grains of dust. Res extensa pertains to
art history, to the history of the publishing press, to the
history of computers, to the history of perspective, 
to the history of projective geometry, and to a host of
other disciplines, but it is definitely not part of natural
history. Among the most puzzling features of the
Moderns is how extremely diﬃcult it is for them to be
materialist: What they call matter remains even today
a highly idealist projection.
What would be amusing, if it had not been such a
waste of time, is that “spiritualists” have exerted them-
selves for three centuries trying to save from the
diluvium the little arch of the human soul floating on 
the vast ocean of the ever-mounting res extensa, without
realizing that this ocean was but a trickle of highly local-
ized techniques to allow on paper—and later on screen—
the manipulation of figures by conserving a certain
number of constants. The achievements of what I have
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one provided by naturalization (a human made up of
idealized bits extracted from all the scientific disciplines
parading as matter), the other provided by socialization
(a human extracted from the life supports and air-
conditioning that allow it to survive). 
The choice is not between nature and society—
two ways of being inhuman. The real choice is between 
two utterly diﬀerent distributions of spatial conditions: 
one in which there is a vast outside and infinite space
but where every organism is cramped and unable to
deploy its life forms; the other in which there are only
tiny insides, networks and spheres, but where the
artificial conditions for the deployment of life forms are
fully provided and paid for.
Does it make a diﬀerence? You bet. Do you realize
that organisms are still homeless in the strictures of
Modernism? That we are still unable to define what a
tool, a technique, and a technology are, without alter-
nating between hype and nostalgia? That there is still 
no space for making sense of the billions of migrations
that define the “global” but in eﬀect not-so-global
world? That, as it became pretty clear last fall, we still
don’t have, after two centuries of economics, a remotely
realistic portrait of what an economy is, of the simple
phenomenon of confidence, trust, and credit? That we
are unable to find space for gods except by putting them
into the cesspool of the mind? That psychology is still a
tramp looking for a plausible shelter? 
Every winter in France we are faced with the same
crise du logement, the same building crunch. Well, 
there is a crise du logement of truly gigantic proportion
Such an important turn in the history of rationality
should not be overlooked: Whereas in earlier periods,
the advent of Reason was predicated on the nonlocal,
nonsituated, nonmaterial utopia of mind and matter, 
it is now possible to dissipate those phantoms and to
observe them move inside specific spheres and networks.
At any rate, we might now be slightly more realistic
about what it is to be thrown into the world and attached
to objects. “The Sleep of Reason” may “Produce
Monsters” but also sweet dreams: It has taken some 
time for Reason to finally wake up from those as well. 
I recognize that at first this could seem like a bizarre
contradiction: How could we claim that spheres and
networks provide more space when their first eﬀect is 
to shrink everything that was outside and un-situated
inside precisely delineated arenas? To be sure the
critical eﬀect is clearly visible: The global is accomp-
anied back to the rooms in which it is produced; the laws
of nature are situated inside the quasi-“parliaments”
where they are voted on, and no one is allowed to jump
outside as if there existed a room of no room. But how
could we keep pretending that this shrinking enterprise
provides in the end more space for a more comfortably
habitable world, that it is not just a critical move, a clever
but in the end only negative mean of humiliating the
arrogance of materialists and spiritualists alike? 
Well, to understand why it is not a contradiction or 
a paradox, or even a critical move, you have to consider
the alternative: a vast outside that is so un-situated as to
be totally implausible, where the only choice oﬀered to
its inhabitants is between two forms of inhumanity: 
“THE NOTION OF ‘ENVIRONMENT’ BEGAN TO OCCUPY
PUBLIC CONSCIOUSNESS PRECISELY WHEN IT WAS
REALIZED THAT NO HUMAN ACTION COULD COUNT 
ON AN OUTSIDE ENVIRONMENT ANY MORE: THERE IS
NO RESERVE OUTSIDE WHICH THE UNWANTED
CONSEQUENCES OF OUR COLLECTIVE ACTIONS COULD
BE ALLOWED TO LINGER AND DISAPPEAR FROM VIEW.”
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Everything happens as if the ecological crisis had
taken the Moderns totally unprepared: There is not the
slightest chance for nature-and-society to be able to
handle the crowding of organisms clamoring for a place
to deploy and sustain their life forms. Modernism is good
at displacing, at migrating in various utopias, at elimi-
nating entities, at vacuuming, at breaking with the past,
and at claiming to go outside, but if you ask it to place,
replace, sustain, accompany, nurture, care, protect,
conserve, situate—in brief, inhabit and deploy—none 
of the reflexes we have learned from its history are of
much use. 
Worse, Modernism has had the added consequence,
even more dangerous at the present juncture, of identi-
fying the taste for habitation with the past, with the inno-
cent, with the natural, with the untrampled, so that, just
at the moment when what is needed is a theory of the
artificial construction, maintenance, and development
of carefully designed space, we are being drawn back to
another utopia—a reactionary one this time—of a myth-
ical past in which nature and society lived happily
together (“in equilibrium,” as they say, in “small face-
to-face communities” without any need for artificial
design). Even worse, Modernism has so intoxicated the
very militants of ecology (those, you might have
thought, who had the most interest in rethinking what 
it is to situate and to place) that they have proposed to
reuse nature-and-society, this time to “save nature,”
promising us a future where we should be even “more
natural”! Which means, if you have followed me, even
less human, even less realistic, even more idealist, 
even more utopian. I am all for recycling, but if there is
one thing not to recycle, it is the notion of “nature”! 
It is hard to realize that the trouble with nature is tied
to the notion of space that has come from the confusion—
instantiated in the res extensa—between the ways we
come to know things and the ways things stand by them-
selves. In a quite radical fashion, spheres and networks
are two ways of defusing the notion of res extensa:
spheres because they localize the Umwelt that could
serve as a cradle to house the things-in-themselves, net-
works because they allow us to respect the objectivity of
the sciences without having to buy the epistemological
baggage that drags it down. For the first time since the
bifurcation of nature (a phrase Whitehead proposed to
point out the strange 17th-century divide between
primary and secondary qualities), we might have a way
to throw Dasein into the world without misrepresenting
either Dasein or the world into which it is thrown.
in our total inability to find rooms for the homeless of
Modernism. Indeed, Modernism itself is homeless,
forcing its inhabitants to dream of a place to live that is
uninhabitable —dare I say it? —by construction. What we
need is more room for a new type of real or realist estate.
(In a strange sense and in spite of so much work on
Modernist architecture, the links to be made between
Modernism and architecture have not even begun yet—
and this might be the reason why, strangely enough, 
so many intellectual enterprises, after a detour through
Romance language departments in the 1980s, have
recently migrated from deserted philosophy depart-
ments to design and architecture schools.)
There is some urgency in concluding the thought
experiment I invited you to make, because the outside is
in short supply today anyway. It is not by coincidence
that spheres and networks have been proposed as an
alternative to the nature-and-society quandary just at
the moment when the ecological crisis began to throw
the very notion of an outside in doubt. As is now well
known, the notion of “environment” began to occupy
public consciousness precisely when it was realized that
no human action could count on an outside environ-
ment any more: There is no reserve outside which the
unwanted consequences of our collective actions could
be allowed to linger and disappear from view. Literally
there is no outside, no décharge where we could dis-
charge the refuse of our activity. What I said earlier,
rather philosophically, that the problem was “lack of
space,” now takes a much more radical, practical,
literal, and urgent meaning: No outside is left. As usual,
Peter has a striking way to bring this up when he says
that the earth is finally round: Of course we knew that
before, and yet the earth’s rotundity was still theoretical,
geographical, at best aesthetic. Today it takes a new
meaning because the consequences of our actions travel
around the blue planet and come back to haunt us: It is
not only Magellan’s ship that is back but also our refuse,
our toxic wastes and toxic loans, after several turns.
Now, we sense, we suﬀer from it: The earth is round for
good. What the churches had never managed to make 
us feel—that our sins will never disappear—has taken 
a new meaning: There is no way to escape our deeds. 
And it burns like hell!
The disappearance of the outside is certainly the
defining trait of our epoch. We are trying to crowd
billions of humans and their trillions of aﬃliates into
cramped loci, and there is no space. And even more
troubling than the lack of space is the lack of place—
of placing, of placement. 
